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Recent growth experience in developing countries is reviewed, with an emphasis on 
structural change and sources of effective demand. How policy influences such 
outcomes is analyzed in light of historical experience. Options are discussed for macro 
and industrial/commercial policy, and how they may influence the growth process. The 
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1 Recent  development 
Looking at recent history, a first point that stands out is that there has been a massive 
divergence of growth rates in the last decades. Figure 1 shows income ratios of poor to 
rich countries in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms for selected regions in the second 
half of the last century, based on data from Maddison (2001). The East Asian ‘Tigers’ 
are the only group showing a sustained increase over most of the period, with modest 
catching-up on the part of other Asian regions (including China since the 1980s, and 
more recently India) in the last 25 years. Elsewhere, ratios declined, most notably for 
the Middle East and the formerly socialist countries after 1975. The diagram is 
disturbing especially because the downward paths of the ratios in several instances are 
due to stagnation or a decrease in the absolute value of GDP per capita of the follower 
countries. For example, Africa’s GDP per capita decreased from a high of 1,433 Geary-
Khamis dollars1 in 1977 to 1,217 in 1998. The Middle East fell to 4,053 Geary-Khamis 
dollars in 1998 from 4,716 in 1977. Lastly, the former USSR lost ground in record time, 
from 7,078 dollars per capita in 1989 to 3,893 in 1998.2  
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1 Geary-Khamis dollars for the year 1990 are Maddison’s preferred benchmark numeraire for computing 
PPP income levels. 
2 Needless to say, Figure 1 runs completely counter to the ahistorical optimism of mainstream authors 
such as Lucas (2000). His model resembles a horserace with a staggered start. Each successive group of 
poor countries leaves the gate some time after its immediate predecessor and then appropriates existing 
technology to run faster than all the rest to catch up. Because the USSR must now be reckoned a failure, 
over almost 200 years Japan and possibly the Tigers are the only observed successes among new entrants 
to the race.    2
It is also notable that sustained growth among ‘successful’ countries was accompanied 
by structural change, an aspect of the whole process of development that has basically 
been ignored for the past 20 years. Tables 1 and 2 provide numerical illustrations, with 
implications for development theory. The former gives a decomposition of labour 
productivity growth for the Tigers and Southeast Asia between tradeable and non-
tradeable sectors, with the overall total as a weighted average at the far right.3 The total 
incorporates own-rates of productivity growth (weighted by output shares) for all 
sectors and ‘reallocation effects’, which are positive for sectors with relatively low 
average productivity (often non-tradeables) in which employment falls or for high-
productivity sectors (tradeables) in which employment rises. 














Source: Author’s calculations based on www.icsead.org and UN databases. 
 
In the Tiger region, weighted own-rates of productivity growth in both sectors are high 
and reallocation effects generally positive. In Southeast Asia on the other hand, non-
tradeable productivity growth lags the rate in tradeables (the finding for most countries) 
and reallocation effects are often negative. This sort of contrast underlines how different 
economies perform differently at a disaggregated level, which undoubtedly helps 
determine their performance overall. Table 2 decomposes growth rates of the economy-
wide employment/population ratio (far right) into an average of growth rates of the ratio 
by sectors weighted by employment shares. As it turns out, the ratio of a sector’s own-
employment to population will rise if the growth rate of its output per capita exceeds its 
growth rate of labour productivity.  
 
The panel for the Tigers shows that agriculture consistently shed labour while ‘other’ 
(tertiary) sectors created jobs. Manufacturing was job creating during the 1980s but 
                                                 
3 Rada and Taylor (forthcoming) present the formal details of the decomposition procedures discussed 
herein as well as empirical results for 12 regions. 
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Productivity
Sector's Productivity Reallocation effect Sector's Productivity Reallocation effect Total
1980-1985 2.2% 0.1% 1.3% 0.5% 4.1%
1986-1990 2.0% -0.1% 3.5% 0.3% 5.7%
1991-1995 2.5% 0.1% 2.5% 0.3% 5.3%
1996-2000 1.8% 0.0% 1.8% 0.0% 3.6%
Tradables Non-tradables
Tigers Region: Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan
Source: Authors’ calculations (www.icsead.org and UN database)
Productivity
Sector's Productivity Reallocation effect Sector's Productivity Reallocation effect Total
1980-1985 0.5% -0.6% -0.7% 1.9% 1.0%
1986-1990 1.1% -1.0% 3.0% 0.8% 3.9%
1991-1995 3.1% 0.2% 0.9% 1.5% 5.7%
1996-2000 0.1% -0.3% -0.7% 0.5% -0.4%
Tradables Non-tradables
South East Asia Region: Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam  3
shifted to shedding labour (to a lesser degree than agriculture) in the 1990s. In Southeast 
Asia, agriculture was a far less dynamic labour source than in the Tigers and the other 
sectors were less effective at creating jobs so the overall employment/population ratio 
was quite stable.  








Source: Author’s calculations based on www.icsead.org and UN databases. 



















Decompositions such those in Tables 1 and 2 can readily be constructed to analyze 
disaggregated effects of external shocks, import substitution and export promotion 
y
Agriculture Manufacturing Others Total
1980-1985 -1.3% 0.2% 1.7% 0.6%
1986-1990 -0.7% 1.1% 1.8% 2.2%
1991-1995 -0.8% -0.3% 2.1% 1.0%
1996-2000 -0.3% -0.2% 1.0% 0.5%
Tiger Region: Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan
Source: Authors’ calculations (www.icsead.org and UN database)
South East Asia Region: Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam
Agriculture Manufacturing Others Total
1980-1985 -0.4% 0.0% 0.5% 0.1%
1986-1990 -0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0%
1991-1995 -1.2% 0.2% 0.6% -0.5%
1996-2000 -0.3% 0.1% 0.2% -0.1%
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policies, and so on. Work along these lines ceased to be popular two decades ago but 
that does not mean it is useless. In one final illustration of structural change, Figure 2 
gives net borrowing flows (incomes minus expenditures) over time for the government, 
private, and rest of the world sectors in the Tiger region (normalized by GDP). As an 
accounting identity, borrowings must sum to zero: 
 
  (Private investment – saving) + (Public spending – taxes) + (Exports – Imports) = 0 
 
with a positive entry indicating that a sector is a net contributor to effective demand. 
 
In the Tigers, public sector spending as a share of GDP has been close to zero, so that 
private and foreign net lending and borrowing levels look like twins. There was an 
external deficit in the early 1980s, with a reversal signaled by the Plaza accord in 1985. 
A surplus period followed until the early 1990s, then a deficit which ended as the region 
switched to a strong trade surplus after the 1997 crisis. The private sector pattern is 
broadly the same, with signs reversed. Of course, the diagram does not establish which 
‘twin’ is driving the other, but it does point to linkages to be explored. Again, patterns 
across countries differ. The Tigers illustrate flexible adjustment in the face of external 
and internal shifts. Elsewhere, one or another sector may consistently lead demand, as 
has the government for several decades in India. What one does not see in general are 
opposite-signed co-movements of the fiscal and foreign deficits. That is, the traditional 
‘twin deficits’ of orthodox open economy macroeconomics do not often appear. They 
have been at the core of IMF stabilization packages for 50 years. Small wonder that the 
programmes very often fail. 
 
These decompositions are also useful in tracing though the implications of a major 
policy shift that has occurred worldwide since the 1980s—a move on the part of most 
countries to deregulate or liberalize their external current and capital accounts along 
with domestic labour and financial markets. They have also privatized public 
enterprises, de-emphasized industrial policy interventions, and allowed a greater private 
sector role in general. The results have been mixed (Taylor 2006). 
 
As Figure 1 illustrates, growth performances deteriorated in many parts of the world. 
The success cases—the Tigers, China, and more recently India—are scarcely paragons 
of neoliberalism. Liberalization has often been accompanied by a peculiar combination 
of ‘macro prices,’ strong real exchange rates and high interest rates in particular. 
Together with current account deregulation, the shift in prices seemed to stimulate 
productivity growth and hold down demand in tradeable sectors which consistently shed 
jobs. Along the lines of Table 2, any employment creation that occurred took place in 
agriculture and non-tradeable sectors, often at lower pay levels than in tradeables. 
Import ‘leakage’ coefficients tended to rise and saving rates to decline in the wake of 
liberalization, leading to the net borrowing pattern illustrated in Figure 2 for the Tiger 
countries in the 1990s prior to the crisis. Not just in Asia, such shifts have been   5
brusquely reversed as external accounts deteriorated. In somewhat related fashion, 
privatization and financial deregulation were followed by financial crises (sometimes 
repeated) in many countries. 
 
Other supply-side policies seemed to have a range of results. Take the effort to stimulate 
human capital accumulation. A useful indicator is average years of schooling. After the 
1970s, its growth rates were broadly similar in the Tigers, Latin America, and sub-
Saharan Africa. Levels differed, being roughly nine, six, and three years respectively in 
2000. It may be that a certain level of human capital is required to support development, 
but faster growth  of this ‘produced means of production’ is clearly not closely 
associated across regions with higher growth rates of output per capita. Distributive 
impacts of all these changes also were mixed. High-quality jobs were lost in tradeable 
sectors but in some cases employment opened up in non-tradeables benefiting the poor. 
The functional distribution often shifted against labour and in favour of profits and 
(especially) interest earnings associated with newly deregulated financial sectors. 
Turkey and Brazil are striking examples of economies in which a distributive shift 
toward the financial sector has been accompanied by skewed macro prices, overall 
instability, and unimpressive growth over the medium run. 
2  Some more ancient history 
It makes sense to place these relatively recent observations against a longer historical 
background, with a focus on the role of the state. Following Chang (2002) we can 
briefly consider how macro and micro ‘policy’ was formed when currently prosperous 
countries were growing rapidly.  
 
In the USA throughout the nineteenth century, for example, investment in infrastructure 
like the Erie Canal and the railroads was aggressively supported by several levels of 
government, with subsidies to the private sector often channelled via Wall Street which 
always took care to cream off a generous portion of the funding (Shapiro and Taylor 
1990). The period between the Civil War and the 1890s was of course incredibly 
corrupt, with robber barons practically ruling the land under a succession of permissive 
Republican administrations in Washington. Even after the partial private regulation or 
‘Morganization’ of finance in the 1890s and the subsequent reformist pressure from the 
Populists and Progressives, the system was at best partly democratic and economically 
opaque. All of this went on behind towering tariff walls, in a bank-based financial 
system without a central bank, embellished by patchy property rights and a corrupt 
judiciary. 
 
Similar periods of state-sponsored developmentalism took place elsewhere. Sweden 
between the 1930s and 1980s where a long string of Social Democratic governments 
actively collaborated with private industrial groups, notably the Wallenberg empire. 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan long had close state/private collaboration which has been   6
chronicled by many scholars (Alice Amsden and Robert Wade were the pioneers). 
Brazil was ultimately less successful but had an extremely high growth rate during 
1950-80 under state control. And as noted in connection with Figure 1, China and India 
are more recent success cases with rather tightly regulated market systems. 
3  Thinking about development 
Liberalization was of course heavily promoted by the Bretton Woods Institutions under 
the famous aegis of the ‘Washington Consensus’. One new strand in development 
thinking is related to liberalization’s motley and often unfavourable outcomes. It is the 
study of ‘governance’ or how ‘institutions’ condition the development process. This line 
of thought easily boils down to ‘blame the victim’. To put the two institutions’ 
accusation in a childish vein: ‘We gave you all those great policies. They haven’t 
worked. Which means you have bad institutions. So it is your fault.’ 
 
Now of course the Bank and the Fund do not normally rant, but they have engaged in a 
great deal of discourse about how developing and transition economies should pull up 
their institutional socks along neoliberal lines, a view that is thoroughly ahistorical as 
discussed above. Other ideas are more worth developing. We can begin with notions 
relevant to the growth process as such. One important point, strongly enunciated by 
Nayyar (2005), is that policymakers in developing countries have had their hands tied 
by the liberalization process in the areas of macroeconomics and industrial policy 
among others.  
 
An idea tracing back to Adam Smith and recently restated by Reinert (2005) is that the 
economy can usefully be viewed as a combination of dynamic increasing returns sectors 
and more plodding constant or decreasing returns activities. The goal is to stimulate the 
former while shifting resources (especially labour) from the latter. Tables 1 and 2 
illustrate how the Tigers succeeded at this task. The question is how to design policies 
that will facilitate similar processes elsewhere. As illustrated in Figure 3, Kaldor (1978) 
has always been a fertile source of thought about such an endeavour. Indeed, charting 
institutional changes that could open up degrees of freedom for the pursuit of 
developmentalist policies looks like a more fruitful approach than abstractly theorizing 
about institutions and trying to quantify their impacts along purely neoclassical lines. 
Some examples: does the open economy ‘trilemma’ really bind? That is, can 
independent monetary/fiscal policies, exchange rate programming, and open capital 
markets all be combined? In the land of textbooks it is straightforward to show that they 
can be, or in other words that the Mundell-Fleming ‘duality’ between a floating 
exchange rate and control of the money supply does not exist. A central bank in 
principle has enough tools at its disposal to control monetary aggregates regardless of 
the forces determining the exchange rate.4   
                                                 
4 For the gory textbook details see chapter 10 in Taylor (2004). Frenkel and Taylor (2005) present a more 
institutionally nuanced discussion.    7
In practice, however, arbitrary changes in monetary and exchange rate policies may be 
attacked by markets. Along Nayyar’s lines, the question then becomes one of how other 
policies may be deployed to widen boundaries on feasible maneuvers. Frenkel and 
Taylor (2005) argue that under appropriate circumstances a weak exchange rate can be 
desirable for developmentalist reasons. The ‘circumstances’ include a productive sector 
which is responsive to price signals, a monetary authority willing and able to maintain a 
weak rate for an extended period of time (perhaps supported by capital market and other 
interventions), and political willingness to bear the (conceivably high) initial costs of 
devaluation including potential inflation and output contraction. Getting away from the 
recent obsession with using the exchange rate for ‘inflation targeting’ could be a useful 
step toward making it a more developmentally useful policy tool. 
 
In the area of industrial/commercial policy, the impact of the WTO has been to rule out 
interventions involving tariffs and trade while up to a point different forms of subsidies 
(witness Airbus versus Boeing) are still considered kosher. How can developing and 
transition economies operate effectively in this new environment? The Smith-Reinert 
prescription to stimulate increasing returns sectors did not cease to apply when the 
WTO was born. The question is how to implement it under present circumstances. 
 
At the macro level, the question implicit in Table 2 is also relevant: how can economies 
avoid the ‘jobless growth’ that has been characteristic of the liberalization period? 
Evidently, productivity growth must be positive for per capita incomes to rise but 
demand growth must be stronger for employment to be created. It remains to be seen in 
many countries whether they will be able to programme rapid growth in demand under a 
regime of liberalized international capital markets. And how are these markets 
themselves to be regulated? This question became internationally prominent after the 
round of crises in the late 1990s. It could return again. 
 
One way to summarize some of these ideas is in terms of differential growth rates of 
labour productivity, which have historically been the most important force behind 
diverging income levels across countries. Following Ocampo (2001) and ultimately 
Kaldor (1978), productivity growth in the medium run can be viewed as the outcome of 
two positive feedback loops building up from basic input factors such as the 
accumulation of physical and human capital, jumps in productivity resulting from 
successful industrial and trade policy, and the exploitation of technological 
backwardness. As will be seen, this system has strong implications for employment 
growth as well. 
 
The first loop is from output and/or capital stock growth to labour productivity growth, 
as emphasized by Verdoorn (1949) and Kaldor. These authors insisted that industrial 
expansion (or, more generally, expansion of tradeable or increasing returns sectors) is 
the key factor in transmitting technological advance. The second loop runs from labour 
productivity growth to output growth. Potential channels include stimulation of   8
investment demand and relaxation of foreign exchange shortages via more rapidly 
growing production for exports. Finally, the growth rate of employment is equal to the 
difference between the growth rates of output and productivity. Following Rada and 
Taylor (2004), this observation means that one can plot ‘employment growth contours’ 
with slopes of 45 degrees in a diagram with the output growth rate ( X ˆ ) on the 
horizontal axis and the labour productivity growth rate ( ) L ξ  on the vertical. Each line 
shows combinations of the two rates that hold the employment growth rate ( L X L ξ − = ˆ ˆ ) 
constant. Employment growth is more rapid along contours further to the SE. As in 
Kaldor’s (1978) original diagram (sketched verbally but not actually drawn in this 
paper), Figure 3 also contains illustrative schedules for a ‘Kaldor-Verdoorn’ technical 
progress function (the first loop mentioned above) and ‘output growth’ (second loop). 




















The dominant tradition in growth theory is to make  X ˆ  endogenous by combining a pre-
determined growth rate of employment with a technical progress function, in effect 
dropping the Output growth relationship. For example, if employment grows at the rate 
corresponding to the contour passing through point A, then its intersection with the 
Kaldor-Verdoorn schedule determines X ˆ . If employment growth were faster, say along 
the contour passing through point B, then  X ˆ  would increase as well. However, under 
the standard assumptions its response elasticity would be less than one, so that output 
growth per employee is lower at C than A. This finding has important implications for   9
the interpretation of mainstream growth methodology.5 A second way to make the 
schedules in the diagram consistent with one another is to ignore the technical progress 
function while combining a predetermined employment growth rate with the output 
growth function as at point C. The productivity growth rate becomes ‘endogenous’ and 
unrelated to the Kaldor-Verdoorn schedule, precisely in the sense of New Growth 
Theory.6  
 
A third approach to Figure 3 is to combine Kaldor-Verdoorn and output growth 
schedules, letting employment growth be determined along one of its contour lines as at 
point D. In a developing country context, one might reasonably take effective demand 
or available foreign resources as binding restrictions on  X ˆ .7 With such a growth rate 
‘closure’, effects on employment of shifts in the two schedules become of interest. The 
employment growth rate is higher for combinations of values of  X ˆ and  L ξ  lying below 
the contour running through D than at the point itself, and lower for combinations 
above. Faster overall productivity growth in the sense of an upward shift of the Kaldor-
Verdoorn schedule would reduce L ˆ due to ‘labour shedding’; an outward shift in the 
output growth schedule (for example, due to more rapidly growing aggregate demand 
and/or more availability of foreign exchange possibly) would speed up job creation.  
 
Insofar as increased employment growth is a policy objective, it may or may not 
transpire depending on how the schedules shift. As we have seen, external liberalization 
in many developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s was associated with faster 
productivity than demand growth (especially in traded goods sectors), leading to 
reductions inL ˆ. A combination of active industrial and exchange rate policies could 
possibly speed output growth enough to offset the job losses that liberalization has 
provoked. 
 
Finally, a few thoughts about microeconomics. Stein (2005) points out the major 
complaint to be made about recent work is that economists have been spending far too 
much time using increasingly sophisticated techniques to examine data that are 
available, rather than thinking about how diverse economies really function in practice 
(which could suggest new ways to generate useful information). In other words, the 
profession suffers from the ‘looking under the lamp post’ syndrome. Even worse, the 
                                                 
5 For example, slower population growth will be associated with faster income growth per capita, a 
deduction from the model often used to support population control programmes. The fact that countries 
with negative population growth are not racing toward greater prosperity belies this particular notion. 
6 For example, the well-known ‘AK’ model includes predetermined values of the national saving rate(s) 
and the output/capital ratio (u). Their product determines the output growth rate, su X = ˆ . 
7 Demand-driven growth models are presented in Rada and Taylor (2004). External constraints can be 
modeled in a gap model framework (Taylor 1994), taking into account foreign aid, capital movements, 
and shifts in the terms of trade. Using a counterfactual methodology, Taylor and Rada (2003) show that 
output growth rates in the late twentieth century in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America might have 
been substantially higher if the debt crisis and adverse terms of trade shocks had not happened.   10
axiomatic nature of neoclassical economics has meant that data are used for 
‘verification’ of theories, not their falsification. It is no surprise that the mainstream has 
such a paucity of new ideas to offer the developing world. Indeed, the major academic 
topics date back for decades: endless themes and variations around human capital; ever 
finer detail on the measurement of poverty with scant consideration of the 
socioeconomic forces that permit it to continue to exist; imperfect information models 
that 40 years ago seemed to be a mildly illuminating way to look at phenomena like 
sharecropping but which have little new to offer today; and the North/Coase musings 
about property rights that underlie much of the governance/institutional literature 
mentioned above. A more recent, seemingly more relevant literature based on field 
evidence in what the sociologist Peter Evans (2005) calls the ‘institutional turn’ usually 
turns out to be ersatz political science or sociology couched in phraseology that 
economists can understand. 
 
As noted above, the institutional literature has been used by the Bank and Fund to 
justify the failures of their market friendly policies. At the same time, many recent 
micro models support the old development economists’ view that poor countries are rife 
with market failures which can only be overcome by proactive policy intervention. The 
Bretton Woods institutions seem to want the theory to run both ways. 
4  Where to go from here 
As an institute devoted to development economics research, UNU-WIDER can and 
should play a major role in exploring the issues pointed out above—the analysis of 
structural change; a serious study of institutions and the role of the state, ideally from 
the perspectives of the ‘old’ institutional economics of Veblen, Myrdal, and Galbraith 
and Hobsbawm’s (certainly not North’s) brand of economic history; and the 
construction of policy-relevant micro and macro models of developing and transition 
economies which can withstand academic scrutiny but which are not driven by 
academic fads. Lal Jayawardena, the inaugural director of UNU-WIDER, tried to push 
the institute in these directions. I hope it will continue to realize his vision for a long 
time to come. 
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